

**NOISE
WITHOUT
EFFECT**

*Anti-Pashinyan
disinformation on the
rise ahead of Armenian
parliamentary elections*

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Anti-Pashinyan disinformation on the rise ahead of Armenian parliamentary elections

Authors:

Floréane Marinier
Valentin Châtelet
with contributions from Zoé D.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In [its fourth report](#) on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threats, the European External Action Service (EEAS) observed that Kremlin-linked propagandists have shifted their efforts to destabilise the 2024 Moldovan presidential elections to the Armenian parliamentary elections. The leaders of both countries (President Maia Sandu and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan) have shifted their foreign policy orientation away from their long-standing partner, Russia, and toward closer ties with the European Union.

In December 2025, Russian FIMI campaigns targeting Armenia focused on [spreading fearmongering narratives](#) using Information Manipulation Sets (IMS) such as Overload and Storm-1516, with veiled threats that Armenia could be attacked using the same pretext that was used to justify the war of aggression in Ukraine.

Russian actors were not the only ones to spread disinformation about the Armenian Prime Minister. According to [a report by Carnegie Europe](#), "two forces beyond the country's borders, which have had significant influence there for two decades, are now leading the charge against him: the nationalist wing of the Armenian diaspora, especially in the United States, and Russia". This analysis can be partially corroborated by our findings, though Russian IMS activity was significantly more prominent than diaspora-driven content in our monitoring.

With the help of tools developed by CheckFirst, we documented the various ways Pashinyan was targeted online, on social media, and on messaging apps.

Key findings:

- French users of TikTok have been confronted with content mostly hostile to Pashinyan when searching his name, with AI-generated content alongside regular videos originating from accounts linked to the Kremlin, the Armenian diaspora, or Azerbaijan.
- Well-known pro-Russian disinformation actors and EU-sanctioned media (such as TV channel Izvestia, French activist Boris Karpov and Russian Telegram channels network Rybar) outlets fuelled articles in French on the Pravda network.
- The latest leaked slide deck of [Social Design Agency \(SDA\)](#), a Russian IT firm with strong ties to the Kremlin, shows direct links to the overtaking of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) media outlets.
- Over the months of November and December 2025, we identified at least 72 sites linked to the Russian influence IMS Storm-1516. 56 Storm-1516 domains had also been registered and reposted narratives targeting Prime Minister Pashinyan and pushing pro-Russian narratives. Seventeen domain names also harboured Storm-1516 fake news sites that previously targeted the French municipal elections.
- Storm-1516 assets spread false articles on X, impersonating newsrooms to push false claims on PM Pashinyan. These findings are consistent with the [November 2025 Gnida Project's research](#) on defamatory claims against PM Pashinyan disseminated on X.



INTRODUCTION

On June 7th, 2026, Armenia held its first regularly scheduled parliamentary elections since 2017, a vote that took place against a backdrop of deep geopolitical realignment and made the country a prime target for foreign Information Manipulation Sets (IMSs). The vote came at a pivotal moment, following the 2020-2023 loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, the [displacement of over 100,000 Armenians](#), and a landmark peace deal signed with Azerbaijan in August 2025.

Moreover, Pashinyan has pursued a marked pivot toward the European Union. In March 2026, he [addressed the European Parliament](#) and declared Armenia on track to meet EU membership criteria. The previous April, the Armenian parliament had adopted legislation formally initiating the accession process. Russia, which leads both the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union of which Armenia remains a member, has responded with escalating pressure, arguing that Yerevan cannot simultaneously pursue EU integration and EAEU membership, and calling for a referendum on the matter. Vladimir Putin went further, suggesting Armenia risked following a 'Ukraine scenario' should it continue deepening ties with Brussels.

This tense geopolitical context made the elections a magnet for foreign IMSs, whose activities were already extensively documented prior to the vote.

During our research, we observed narratives targeting Nikol Pashinyan directly, originating from Russian-linked actors and/or influencers within the diaspora or from Azerbaijan. The re-elected Prime Minister was portrayed as either the EU's puppet, an asset of Azerbaijan, or a brutal politician who intends on tearing his own country apart. This report demonstrates how these narratives were disseminated on social media and via IMSs such as [Overload](#), Pravda and [Storm-1516](#).

METHODOLOGY

Data collection was carried out between April 22nd, 2026, and May 22nd, 2026, using 10 keywords in French, English and Russian (see the section in the annexes below). To conduct this investigation, researchers used two tools developed by CheckFirst:

- [CrossOver Monitoring](#): CrossOver was used to browse the content shown by YouTube, TikTok and Bluesky's recommendation algorithms to non logged-in users located in Paris. Data collection was executed at least between one and three times per week during the monitoring period. The results varied very little during that time.
- A dashboard created to monitor Overload emails, Telegram channels and social media accounts that were related to them. Researchers also entered keywords to monitor disinformation content being spread by Overload-related Bluesky accounts.

Researchers entered keywords on Google Search alongside French and Armenian [Pravda network](#) website URLs to find articles related to Nikol Pashinyan and to elections.

I. PLATFORM FINDINGS: ANTI-PASHINYAN CONTENT **ACROSS TIKTOK, X AND YOUTUBE**

On TikTok, anti-Pashinyan content is powered by AI.

From the perspective of a user in France searching for the term "Pashinyan" on TikTok, the majority of videos served are hostile toward Nikol Pashinyan, though for various reasons. Most of the top recommended accounts use AI-generated videos to advance their narratives, though AI use does not necessarily translate into higher view counts. Among the most recurrent content creators users would be exposed to, Russian-speaking account Мир Сейчас @mirseychas is particularly prominent. Alongside videos amplifying Vladimir Putin's statements on international affairs, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine, the account also focuses on the evolving relationship between Armenia and Russia. Videos are subtitled in English. The [most recommended video](#) stands that Nikol Pashinyan distanced himself from Moscow on the topic of Ukraine while reminding that Armenia is, like Russia, a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

The ranking also features content creators who post frequently about Armenian politics, such as the Russian-speaking user @snapnews.24.

Among the most frequently recommended creators on TikTok, the account @zekastudiya also stands out. The channel specializes in AI-generated videos portraying Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Ilham Aliyev in a favorable light, and describes itself in its bio as a business-oriented clip maker. Based in Azerbaijan, the account also advertises AI clip creation services for special occasions.

Diaspora members also account for a significant part of the authors of anti-Pashinyan content TikTok recommends. US-based Armenian diaspora group GlobalHye is also among the most recommended content on TikTok. It presents itself as an organisation focused on connecting the Armenian community with public and private institutions in both the US and Armenia; it also [claims to](#) "influence behavior, shape perception, put new products and companies on the map and keep market leaders there". They notably used the hashtag #Pashinoghlu, a [turkified rendering of Pashinyan's name](#), echoing the opposition argument that his policies ultimately serve Turkish interests rather than Armenian ones.



globalhye

GlobalHye Information Services · Il y a 1 j

Suivre

To every Armenian heading to the polls on June 7th.
Your vote is not just a ballot. It is the voice of a nation that has survived
genocide, war, and betrayal — and refuses to be silent.
Vote for the Armenia that fights back.
Vote for the Armenia that stands tall.
Vote Number 17.
«Միասին կարող ենք:»

Fig 1. Screenshot of the description of a video by GlobalHye's TikTok account on June 6

The account, which sometimes used [AI-generated content](#) deployed in waves to illustrate its messaging, explicitly called on Armenians to vote out Pashinyan, and was still actively promoting Robert Kocharyan as recently as June 6. (Number 17 [refers to](#) the party “Armenia political parties alliance”, or “Armenia Alliance”, led by former President of Armenia Robert Kocharyan). As of June 8th, the account had disappeared from TikTok.

The framing of the narratives pushed by this account aligns with one of Kocharyan's own campaign slogans: “Less Russia means more Turkey.”



Fig 2. Screenshot of a video shared on TikTok by GlobalHye's account



Also prominent in search results for “Pashinyan” on TikTok is the account @ijevan5, a Russian-speaking Armenian creator who [prolifically posts AI-generated videos](#) critical of the Prime Minister.


Finally, one of TikTok's top content creators, @bagdasar2, frequently criticises Pashinyan for his stance on the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. The video highlighted by TikTok's recommendation algorithm showcases [an AI-generated scene](#) featuring Nikol Pashinyan eating Armenia along with Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Storm-1516 content still echoed on X, gets to diaspora


We also observed that on Instagram, GlobalHye [reposted](#) a video accusing Pashinyan of “selling Armenian TV” to a Turkish media holding, a trope that FIP debunked when the video appeared on April 29. According to FIP, the video bears the hallmarks of Storm-1516 content, disseminated via X, an information highlighting how the operation managed to launder this video, which successfully entered GlobalHye's diaspora audience. The video was also reposted by Facebook account “Diaspora Armenians,” that is also linked to GlobalHye.

On X, Storm-1516 assets spread false articles, impersonating newsrooms to push false claims, accusing PM Pashinyan of stealing EAEU funds on his election campaign, having an affair with his secretary, or accusing France of deploying Foreign legion peacekeeping forces to the country ten days before the elections. These were largely [documented](#) by @gnida_project, which reported on the campaign as early as November 2025, consistent with the online assets we've outlined above.

The same accounts found by Fip in their April 29 fact-check were found to be disseminating more tropes targeting Pashinyan during the months and weeks preceding the election. Accounts such as @[RoaaWarStudies](#), @[MrTaffsy](#), and @[FoundAMoron](#) indiscriminately posted Storm-1516 content, with videos and links to false news sites, while engaging in bot-like behaviour. The narratives accused Pashinyan of engaging in fraud, spread slanderous claims, and impersonated authoritative news outlets such as the BBC, and Euronews.

TAFSSY  **@MrTaffsy_** May 27

France just deployed 800 Foreign Legion soldiers to Armenia 10 days before elections. Not for war or peacekeeping. To protect Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and fly him out of the country if things go wrong. Sounds like a dictator's escape plan.



Community note

Fake.
La France n'a pas et n'a pas l'intention d'envoyer de militaires en Arménie.

xcancel.com/ObsDelphi/stat





  2  121  272,011

Fig. 3 An X post by user @MrTaffsy_, spreading Storm-1516 material

On YouTube, French traditional media are the most visible - but there are exceptions

For French users looking for the keyword “Arménie”, YouTube would mostly recommend videos from French media outlets, such as France 24 and TV5MONDE, but also Omerta, a French media outlet whose editorial policy has been described as far right and pro-Russian by French newspapers [Libération](#), [Le Monde](#), and [L’Humanité](#). Its recommended video, published on May 5th, frames Armenia as “one of Macron’s interferences” alongside Moldova and Romania.



Fig 4. Screenshot of Crossover monitoring. Top posters when looking for “Arménie” on YouTube.

On average, media outlets were way more visible on YouTube than on TikTok, no matter which keyword was searched. The result can be split into the following categories:

- Armenian media outlets: Armenpress, CivilNet, Factor TV, Hayeli, Noyan Tapan.
- Azerbaijani media outlets: Caliber, Baku TV.
- Other foreign media outlets: The Kyiv Independent, Hindustan Times, CGTN Europe, BBC News, APT, Times Now World, TV5MONDE, CNEWS, France 24.
- Entertainment channels: Les Arènes du Savoir, Deadliest Roads, CoolVision, Eureka Travel Explorer.
- Influencers: Daniil le Russe, Monor, Syria Analysis
- Members of the diaspora: Hairenik (American-Armenian diaspora association), Armen Avanesyan (violinist who shared a satirical video on Pashinyan, originally belonging to Armenian comedian [Hovhannes Davtyan](#)).

Top videos

Sort by Views




Fig 5. Screenshot of Crossover monitoring. Top posters when looking for “Pashinyan” on YouTube.

Browsing TikTok and YouTube reveals a lack of political diversity among the top results on YouTube and TikTok. Although PM Pashinyan was portrayed as the favourite candidate in recent national polls, the majority of the videos that we found either mocked or criticised him. This tendency varied depending on the platform used for the keyword search: on YouTube, videos from media outlets reporting on the political campaign appeared predominantly, whereas on TikTok, the top content creators were Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian influencers spreading anti-Pashinyan discourse and AI-generated visuals. The narratives emerging from these videos echo those found in articles published by the Pravda network.



II. PRAVDA NETWORK FRAMES NIKOL PASHINYAN AS AN EU ASSET

Eleven articles mentioning Nikol Pashinyan or Armenian elections have been found on the French version of Pravda during the research period. Articles relay content from Telegram channels specialised in spreading pro-Russian propaganda across the internet.

These include Caucasar, a channel affiliated with the pro-Kremlin Telegram channels network Rybar. According to [Media.am](#), “the growing collaboration between the European Union and Armenia in combating disinformation is portrayed [by Caucasar] as an attempt to manipulate and undermine the electoral process”. Another Caucasar post relayed by the Pravda network criticised Armenia for its rapprochement with Ukraine during Zelensky’s visit in early May 2026. Its [Telegram Channel](#) is also cited as a source in a Pravda France article that says that French president Emmanuel Macron went to Armenia with people who were forbidden to enter the Armenian territory, [such as Mourad Papazian](#). The Armenian government accused Papazian of organising an attack on the Pashinyan motorcade in Paris in 2021.

The most popular posts

last 30 days

Export to Excel

by views by shares by forwards by comments by reactions

Post #	Views	Shares
Post #1498	286959	92
Post #1514	217264	48
Post #1702	186183	82
Post #1592	183041	142
Post #1651	176701	169
Post #1698	176685	167
Post #1582	174280	249
Post #1657	167306	59
Post #1524	165774	91
Post #1682	160833	82

КАВКАЗАРЬ
22 Apr, 17:01

По минному полю
о развитии азербайджано-украинского взаимодействия

Координация между властями Азербайджана и т.н. Украины продолжается. Украинцы посетили свое посольство в Баку, где обсудили продолжение сотрудничества с азербайджанским агентством по разминированию ANAMA.

Речь шла о практической реализации меморандума, подписанного руководством стран в прошлом году и предусматривающего обучение специалистов, обмен опытом и т.д.

КАВКАЗАРЬ

Черный список Пашиняна
привез Макрон в Армению

В делегации президента Франции Эммануэля Макрона, который пробыл в Армении три дня, оказались люди, которым был запрещен въезд в республику из-за критики премьера Никола Пашиняна.

Речь идет, прежде всего, о члене бюро АРФ «Дашнакцутюн», сопредседателе Координационного совета армянских организаций Франции Мураде Папазяне, которого сделали персонай нон-грата в Армении после обвинений в организации нападения на кортеж Пашиняна в Париже в 2021 году.

КАВКАЗАРЬ

Принем Тораян был в числе активных участников недавней конференции армянской диаспоры во Франции, на которой критиковали азербайджанский курс властей и защищали Армянскую церковь.

В прессе отмечают, что многих членов делегации Макрона армянские власти не желали видеть, ведь их даже не пригласили медно назад на открытие нового посольства в Париже – в диаспоре это вызвало особое возмущение.

Однако Макрон показал, как действительно относится к решениям Пашиняна. Тем более именно за счет многолетней работы французские армяне в Париже сумели сохранить особые позиции в Армении. Этим армянский премьер сейчас активно пользуется, несмотря на враждебное отношение к роли диаспоры и попытки ослабить её влияние.

Позиции и Макрона, и Пашиняна в собственных странах крайне слабы, и они могут потерять власть. А вот структуры армянской диаспоры традиционно сильны.

#Армения #Франция
@caucasar – не думай о Кавказе свысока

Поддержать нас

18.7K 1.09K 333 1.54K
Subscribers Photos Videos Links

Заквказье – новый плацдарм против России?

DOWNLOAD TELEGRAM

About Blog Apps Platform

Fig 6. Screenshot of the Caucasar Telegram channel

Official Russian media are also featured in the sources: state-owned news agency TASS, TV channels Russia Today, Izvestia and Zvezda, and the website Topwar. Their Telegram channel is systematically displayed as a source in Pravda articles, as well as their Max[.]ru channel. Max[.]ru is a new messenger app developed by Russian technology company VK, and became



the official state app in June 2025, while the Russian communications regulator put restrictions on messenger apps WhatsApp and Telegram.

Some Pravda articles feature direct quotes from close relations of the Russian government, such as Maria Zakharova, director of the information and press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the State Duma.

Main Narratives

“The European Union is meddling with the Armenian elections.” This narrative occurred four times in the Pravda articles we found (either in the Armenian edition or in the French edition). A [Pravda Armenia article](#) is, for example, accusing the EU of preparing a “Romanian-Moldovan scenario” (i.e. to interfere in the elections by supporting pro-EU candidates and by “cleansing” the EU-skeptical candidates). This anti-EU narrative crystallized itself around the European Political Community Summit, which was held in Yerevan at the beginning of May 2026. French President Emmanuel Macron and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky were invited to speak with Nikol Pashinyan. Pravda articles authors maintain that this summit left Mr Pashinyan [with “European values”](#), while [another article](#) claims that he “sold himself to the globalists” Both Volodymyr Zelensky and Emmanuel Macron were targeted directly: the former was labelled “the Ukrainian dictator”, while the latter [was criticised](#) for declining to answer a question from an Izvestia reporter about his wife's absence from the summit

“Nikol Pashinyan is russophobic.” While anti-Russian sentiment rose up in Armenia after Russia refused to help the country during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, so-called russophobia has often been [described by researchers](#) as a Kremlin rhetorical device to counter criticism. We found three French Pravda articles accusing Nikol Pashinyan of anti-Russian sentiment, two of them being related to Telegram channels that are already well known for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives:

- Pro-Russian channel Politnavigator: [linked](#) to an online anti-Ukraine [disinformation news outlet](#) with [alleged](#) links to the FSB. Further investigation shows that the email address used to register the YouTube channel of Politnavigator [belongs](#) to Sergey Stepanov, a Russian journalist based in Sebastopol who is frequently interviewed on pro-Russian media and identifies on LinkedIn as the editor of Politnavigator.
- Boris Karpov: a regular author of Pravda articles, close to the French far right according to the French-language fact-checking website [“Debunkers de Hoax”](#) . He also writes for the “reinformation” French-Russian website [rusreinfo\[.\]ru/fr](#)

The third article we found is related to Russian TV channel Zvezda, which relays a declaration by chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, who says that “Pashinyan handles a hostile policy against Russia”.

“Nikol Pashinyan is brutal towards displaced people from Artsakh.” On May 18th, [a video was published on YouTube showing five armed masked men](#) threatening him. Armenia’s



Investigative Committee announced the launch of an investigation into finding the men in the video and their associates. On the same day, the Armenian Prime Minister attended a public campaign event in Yerevan. Two arguments he had with Artsakh activists in the crowd disturbed this event: one was with Armine Sogoyan, a paediatrician and gynaecologist who was later identified as the sister of a man who went missing during the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh. The other was with Artur Osipyan, president of the Revolutionary Party of Artsakh, [who was later arrested](#) and charged with hooliganism, incitement to violence, and campaign obstruction. Both of these tense encounters nourished French Pravda's depiction of Mr Pashinyan as a violent man. It was relayed by EU-sanctioned TV channel [Russia Today](#) and by an article based on a post by Russian Telegram channel Anna News. The [article](#) compares Pashinyan's politics in Armenia to the 1933 Reichstag fire and claims that Samvel Karapetyan's links with the FSB are "unconfirmed". However, this event doesn't appear to have influenced the content we found when searching for the keyword "Artsakh" on TikTok, featuring declarations from Armenian users who say that they're missing Artsakh or who want Nagorno-Karabakh to remain an Armenian territory, without mentioning the Prime Minister by name. Among these users is the politician [Anna Grigoryan](#), a politician and candidate for re-election as an Armenia Alliance deputy.

"Nikol Pashinyan is pro-Azerbaijan." Pravda France also relayed a Topwar article supporting Strong Armenia's candidate and Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan. He affirms that Nikol Pashinyan destroyed Armenia's relations with its allies (including "their friend, Russia") and that all important decisions about the country [are made in Azerbaijan](#).

III. IMS OVERLOAD EFFORTS ON THE RISE TO SPREAD DEFAMATORY CLAIMS AGAINST PM PASHINYAN

Thanks to an in-house dedicated tool, we were able to gather Overload content that appeared in late April 2026 and in May 2026.



An April 14 email shared a fake French magazine *La Tribune* cover featuring Volodymyr Zelensky and Nikol Pashinyan, alongside this short text: “The French press compares Pashinyan and Zelensky! "Macron is creating a second Zelensky in Armenia," writes *La Tribune*. 50 000 euros to help the losing Pashinyan. Macron is ready to use any means to save his arsonist in Armenia from complete failure”.

The short text ends with a link to the channel ramzayiegokomanda alongside a Russian flag emoji. All related Telegram channels (ramzayiegokomanda, leontinakoен, artsah44, and ukrainereality) display this message except for leontinakoен, which has only one message leading to a Russian-speaking [Azerbaijani channel](#). This channel shares a lot of violent, racist, LGBT-phobic and sexist publications on a daily basis against Armenian people and Armenian personalities (including Nikol Pashinyan and journalist Zori Balayan, who died on April 5th, 2026).

Fig 7. Screenshot of one of the Telegram channels displaying a fake cover of La Tribune

We received emails with TikTok videos claiming that an Armenian journalist in the US known for his work aiming at Nikol Pashinyan was targeted by an assassination attempt (we archived the X post). This email is linked to seven, mostly Belarusian Telegram channels that relay the same text and video (an edited [CNN reporting](#)):

Name of the channel	Archived post
---------------------	---------------

Glyszczabatky	https://archive.is/AfQMC
krepkii_oreshek	https://archive.ph/niHMj
anb_028	https://archive.is/bUVAD
Montirina	https://archive.is/fyhuE
ukrainereality	https://web.archive.org/web/20260131201534/t.me/ukrainereality
belshkvarka	https://web.archive.org/web/20260309012916/t.me/belshkvarka
shkvarka2	https://web.archive.org/web/20260203144108/t.me/shkvarka2

Fig 8. List of the Telegram channels spreading a false claim of an Armenian journalist being attacked

This narrative was also amplified on X [by the account @BelarusInside](#). At the time of writing, the post was still online and the account has not been suspended.




Fig 8. Screenshot of the post by BelarusInside

As [The Insider reports](#), Kremlin-backed Matryoshka bots (linked to IMS Overload) attacked Pashinyan as early as mid-June 2025. We also noticed that more and more Overload emails spread anti-Pashinyan and Western content ahead of the elections as the due date is approaching.

Name of the Tiktok account	Archived post
@rolandlane62	https://archive.ph/8tcOO
@barbaramendez6265	https://archive.ph/wip/jDKR5
@elizabethjensen8365	https://archive.ph/wip/Ya4vv
@kathleenscott63452	https://archive.ph/wip/ENIaj
@rachelhopkins1410	https://archive.ph/wip/lqIO7
@stevelee62111	https://archive.ph/wip/kOTGp
@edwardgrant72235	https://archive.ph/wip/NAc7Q
@lorikim5119	https://archive.ph/wip/J9u1p
@dorothyspencer414	https://archive.ph/wip/awLm6
@joshuayoung37665	https://archive.ph/wip/CfpNQ
@veronicabrooks412	https://archive.ph/wip/3X4eA

Fig 9. List of TikTok accounts that shared the false claim that Nikol Pashinyan assaulted his press secretary



IV. SDA LEAKED DOCUMENTS REVEAL RUSSIA'S ARMENIA-FOCUSED ONLINE EFFORTS

CIS and CSTO assets come under SDA control and post anti-Pashinyan content

Recent [reports](#) revealed that the Social Design Agency (SDA) took over online assets belonging to SNG-MEDIA, a company tasked with maintaining and publishing content on multiple websites of countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, SNG in Russian). A May 24 [OCCRP](#) report and logos presented in the leaked slide deck attributed to SDA indicate direct links to the overtaking of CIS media outlets formerly belonging to SNG-MEDIA, and the suspected ownership of an organization named "CASPIAN 2030." Among the online outlets that SDA took over, the Armenia-focused website [erevan\[.\]one](#) appears as one of the online outlets mobilised in a campaign that targeted Pashinyan.

The below investigation shows that early on, in August 2025 and January 2026, changes in the shareholding structure of organizations linked to SNG-MEDIA, SDA, Nikolay Tupikin and Ilya Gambashidze, indicated a concerted effort to take over the CIS-linked online assets, including Armenia-related website [erevan\[.\]one](#).

Культура > 22 май 2026
Договорилась со старостью: армянка Шер отметила 80-летие и готовится к свадьбе
 • Шахматная держава, новый альбом Тиграна Амасяна и лесная сказка «Колпак»: армянская неделя в Москве
 • Кино памяти востоковед Самвел Шахбазян о фильмах, которые меняют взгляд на Геноцид
 • Боль как товар и кино как оружие: Айказ Хачатурян о Геноциде армян в мировом кинематографе
 • Живой товар для Голливуда: в Москве прошла лекция о Геноциде армян в мировом кинематографе

Спюрк > 21 май 2026
Армяне обули Уругвай: как беглецы от Геноцида построили маленькую Армению на берегу Атлантики
 • Не коньяком единым: Ереван стал мировой столицей вина
 • Почти половине граждан Армении не дадут участвовать в выборах
 • Профессор Гаспарян спасал раненых в Оренбуржье и готовил врачей для фронта
 • «Моя Армения» Стаса Намина

Церковь > 20 май 2026
Григор из темницы и прекрасная Рипсиме: об истории становления Армянской церкви
 • Чтобы христианство овладело душой и сознанием народа: как Маштоц армянский алфавит придумал
 • Краснодарский епископ ААЦ выступил против нападок на армянскую церковь
 • Константинопольский Патриарх ААЦ призвал не считать геноцид непреодолимой стеной
 • Армения умирает, но она выживет. 111 лет с момента геноцида армян в Османской Турции

Мнения > 16 май 2026
На выборах в Армении забыли про армян: куда ведет отрицаемый Пашиняном геополитический контекст
 • Глаза Азнавура: воспоминания о личной встрече
 • О роли Штирлица в армянской публичной политике
 • Беби-бум в масштабах одного ереванского дома
 • Армянской правят бездарные режиссеры несмешных шоу

Запрещено копировать и распространять материалы сайта, без активной ссылки на источник, на сайт [erevan.one](#), ссылка должна быть открыта поисковыми системами.

Новости
 Спюрк
 Политика
 Экономика
 Общество
 Культура
 Община
 Мнения
 Видео

Статьи
 Церковь
 Туризм
 Безопасность
 Здравоохранение
 Спорт
 Технологии
 Наука
 История

ТЕМЫ
 #Дело на одну трубку
 #Маршрут Трампа
 #Дом Москвы в Ереване

КАЛЕНДАРЬ НОВОСТЕЙ
 « Май 2026 »

Пн	Вт	Ср	Чт	Пт	Сб	Вс
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

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 Главный редактор: Шетинни П.К. Учредитель: ООО "СНГ-МЕДИА" | E-mail: Erevan@SNG.Media | Телефон: 8 (495) 201-65-97 | Знак информационной продукции 18+

Fig 10. Screenshot from [erevan\[.\]one](#) mentioning the company "OOO SNG-MEDIA" as a founder of the website.



The below screenshots come from business registry entries of SNG-MEDIA including eravan[.]one and 201vb[.]ru, an online outlet linked to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), showing that SNG-MEDIA, indeed, had ownership of a brand/asset pertaining to other global organizations falling under Russia's leadership.

Организация ООО "СНГ-МЕДИА"

Общие сведения: [Дерево связей](#) [На карте](#) [Отчетность](#)

★ Добавить в избранное (тег) [Добавить описание для себя](#) [Поделиться](#)

Полное юридическое наименование:	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "СНГ-МЕДИА"
Руководитель:	ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ ДИРЕКТОР ЩЕТИНИН ПАВЕЛ КОНСТАНТИНОВИЧ
ИНН / КПП:	7736277396 / 772501001
Уставной капитал:	10 тыс.р
Численность персонала:	3
Количество учредителей:	1
Дата создания:	15.09.2016
Дата регистрации:	15.09.2016
Статус:	Действующее
Блокировка банковских счетов:	Не проверялась (перепроверить)

Специальные налоговые режимы: упрощенная система налогообложения (УСН)

Fig 11. Screenshot from business registry online business registry list-org[.]com



По данным rkn.gov.ru от 09.02.2026 по ИНН является учредителем (соучредителем) 11 средств(а) массовой информации:

Дата	Рег.номер	Наименование	Форма
18.10.2016	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 67503	sng.today (sng.today)	Сетевое издание
09.02.2017	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 68632	sng.fm (sng.fm)	Сетевое издание
07.03.2017	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 68969	turkmenportal.com (turkmenportal.com)	Сетевое издание (действие прекращено)
14.03.2017	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 69063	ARZUW.NEWS (ARZUW.NEWS)	Сетевое издание (действие прекращено)
14.03.2017	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 69062	CENTRALASIA.NEWS (CENTRALASIA.NEWS)	Сетевое издание
01.03.2021	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 80420	Toshkent.Today (toshkent.today)	Сетевое издание
01.03.2021	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 80422	Erevan.One (erevan.one)	Сетевое издание
21.04.2021	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 80928	dushanbe.today (dushanbe.today)	Сетевое издание
21.04.2021	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 80916	caspian.land (caspian.land)	Сетевое издание
21.04.2021	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 80881	201vb.ru (201vb.ru)	Сетевое издание
05.12.2022	ЭЛ № ФС 77 - 84292	tdh.today (tdh.today)	Сетевое издание

Fig 12. List of declared online outlets linked to SNG-MEDIA

In August 2025, the company underwent a change in shareholding participation across multiple organisations. It was notably established as a new shareholder in the ANO Strategic Communications “CASPIAN 2030” and later, welcomed the “Union of CIS Journalists,” in January 2026. Both organizations indicate (1,2) in their leadership and shareholder structures Tupikin and Gambashidze.

Учредители:

Наименование	ИНН	Доля	Сумма
ЩЕТИНИН ПАВЕЛ КОНСТАНТИНОВИЧ	253701251333	100%	10 тыс.₽

[» Показать прошлых учредителей](#)

Является или была в прошлом учредителем следующих организаций:

Дата	Наименование	ИНН	Доля	Сумма
28.01.2026	(ОГРН: 1267700023667)	9725200885		
12.08.2025	АНО СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ КОММУНИКАЦИЙ "КАСПИЙ 2030"	9704263563		

Fig 13. List-org entry on SNG-MEDIA, showing ANO Strategic Communications “CASPIAN 2030,” and the “Union of CIS Journalists”

On May 11, 2026 the UK [issued](#) sanctions against ANO Strategic Communications “CASPIAN 2030” calling it “a new SDA vehicle for carrying out interference in the CIS region.” “CASPIAN 2030” business registry records show that it is indeed controlled by sanctioned Russian person of interest Nikolay Tupikin. Tupikin is linked to SDA’s activities and Russian-backed efforts of



online influence known as Doppelganger due to his involvement with ANO Dialog and ООО Структура.

Additionally, alongside Nikolay Tupikin, CASPIAN 2030's shareholder information also shows that it was established and is under shareholder control of SDA employee Ilya Gambashidze and SDA itself.

Организация АНО СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ КОММУНИКАЦИЙ "КАСПИЙ 2030"

Общие сведения: Дерево связей На карте Отчетность

Добавить в избранное (тег) Добавить описание для себя Поделиться

Полное юридическое наименование:	АВТОНОМНАЯ НЕКОММЕРЧЕСКАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ КОММУНИКАЦИЙ "КАСПИЙ 2030"
Руководитель:	ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ ДИРЕКТОР ТУПИКИН НИКОЛАЙ АЛЕКСАНДРОВИЧ
ИНН / КПП:	9704263563 / 770401001
Количество учредителей:	3
Дата создания:	12.08.2025
Дата регистрации:	12.08.2025
Блокировка банковских счетов:	Не проверялась (перепроверить)

Учредители:

Наименование	ИНН	Доля	Сумма
ООО "СНГ-МЕДИА"	7736277396		
ТУПИКИН НИКОЛАЙ АЛЕКСАНДРОВИЧ	773402066160		
ГАМБАШИДЗЕ ИЛЬЯ АНДРЕЕВИЧ	771401746465		

Fig 14. List-org entry on ANO Strategic Communications CASPIAN 2030, showing Tupikin, SNG-MEDIA, Ilya Gambashidze

Further investigation based on business registry records, shows that SNG-MEDIA took shares on January 28, 2026, in the "Union of CIS Journalists." Business registry records also show that it is entirely controlled by Tupikin, SDA, SNG-MEDIA, and its chief redactor Pavel Schetinin.

IP linkages show SDA took control hosting of SNG-MEDIA and CSTO assets as of May 2026

Data from the Russian business registry shows that the company is responsible for dozens of websites, which we observed were relocated to IP address 31[.]31[.]198[.]158. This IP notably hosts domain names linked to SDA asp[.]world, which the leaked documents from [fip.am](#) do not mention. The domain [appears](#) to have been historically used by SDA to publish findings of monitoring of Western think tanks and news sources.




Fig 15. November 2025 archived webpage of asp[.]world

On DNSlytics, SDA's asp[.]world domain had registered with a description reading "Strength is in knowing the enemy's intentions."





Fig 16. Screenshot from [DNSlytics](#)



Historical WHOIS data shows that the domain asp[.]world which now redirects to SDA's legacy domain (sp-agency[.]ru) was also re-acquired in May 2026 and registered under the name Anna Antipova, the reported executive director of the agency.



The screenshot shows WHOIS data for the domain asp[.]world. The data is presented in a light gray box with a dark gray header on the right that says "8 MAY 2026". The data includes: Name: Anna Antipova (8 domains) UPDATED; Country: Russian Federation (5.33 million domains from Russian Federation for \$500); Nameservers: dns1.yandex.net, dns2.yandex.net UPDATED; Status: CLIENT TRANSFER PROHIBITED UPDATED.

Fig 17. screenshot of [Whoxy](#)

Currently, 130 websites have emerged on this IP address, including odkb[.]world and odkb[.]news, that mirror the content placed on 201vb[.]ru, which, as mentioned above, is referenced under the online outlets registered by SNG-MEDIA, now under SDA control.

V. IMS STORM-1516 TARGETS ARMENIAN AND GLOBAL AUDIENCES

56 Storm-1516 false news websites target Armenian audience

Over the months of November and December 2025, we identified at least 56 fake news sites linked to the Russian IMS Storm-1516 that directly targeted Armenia's presidential election. Using leaked data that pointed to 12 original Storm-1516 domains, we found 35 additional Storm-1516 domains that had also been registered and reposted narratives targeting Pashinyan and pushing pro-Russian narratives. The websites were registered using fifteen different registrars and 24 IP addresses (see Appendix 1).

In total, between November 1, 2025 and May 28, 2026, the network published 37,370 total articles across 56 domains. 35,470 articles (94.9%) were found to be duplicates across the websites in the network, which experienced a surge in publications between January and February 2026, with 742 articles in a single day (Jan 14), and during the weeks preceding election day on June 7, 2026.




Fig 18. A bar chart showing post count over time for Storm-1516 Armenian websites. (CheckFirst)

We found that the domains were often registered using the top-level domains (TLDs) “.am” and “.hwj,” and that they shared the same IP addresses, registering domains over the same periods. Multiple indicators show that the content was duplicated automatically across websites and that the operators used LLMs to tailor the content of the articles, a TTP documented prior and reminiscent of CopyCop articles that included LLM prompts and responses.

By downloading the articles and users from all 56 websites, we found 837 copies of a single article advocating that Armenian clergy “represent Armenia in the world,” published across 17 domains. Another case of a duplicate article recounted the story of how “Police arrested the ‘Freedom’ party chairman,” found in 117 copies across 6 domains throughout April and May 2026.

Further, we found evidence of LLMs being used to rewrite articles. Six domains feature the phrase “waiting for article text to rephrase and present as my own writing,” such as:

Source URL	Archive
https://zrutsakits[.]am/1489-2/	https://ghostarchive.org/archive/RYeD8?wr=false
https://xn--y9aayks5adipc6dll6ad.xn--y9a3aq/3475-2/	https://ghostarchive.org/archive/PinYL?wr=false
https://xn--y9aaid5a0a3ah.xn--y9a3aq/2129-2/	https://ghostarchive.org/archive/YXnDA?wr=false
https://khosnak[.]am/3132-2/	https://ghostarchive.org/archive/XlmU4



https://shiraktesutyun[.]am/3853-2/	https://ghostarchive.org/archive/VDFX8?wr=false
https://hayapaga[.]am/4131-2/	https://ghostarchive.org/archive/8CYXi?wr=false

Fig 19. A table of articles that feature LLM responses in the body of articles

In two cases, we also found two identical articles (1, 2) that also displayed an LLM response displaying the phrase “the survey requires the reorganisation of the given article, keeping all the names, but without any source or announcing the author's opinion. It is required to write in Armenian. Below is the revised article based on the given text.”

In another instance, the website HayMedia (Armenian Media in Armenian) [published](#) an article aimed at spreading narratives of vote-buying ahead of the June 7 election. The article [titled](#) “On giving vote-buying instructions and directing participation in elections to Armenians living in Russia” also features an LLM response that reads “My main task is to analyse the given text and present it as an independent article, preserving all names and surnames, while avoiding any commentary or references to other sources.” In this instance, the article spread accusations of vote buying targeting the party “Strong Armenia.”

In another instance, multiple articles displayed an LLM refusal to rewrite the article, which apparently originated from armenianpress[.]am and then appeared to other domains. We found 109 copies and 9 domains of an Armenian error message that read “the given text cannot be rewritten as it is not a journalistic article.”

208 copies of an article titled “Some users can't access 168[.]am” across 8 domains suggest that the websites pulled content from legitimate Armenian news outlets before rewriting them using LLMs.

One article duplication also directly connects this network of websites to Russia’s Foundation to Battle Injustice and other pro-Kremlin influence operations and influencers on X. 55 domains synchronously reposted an article by the Foundation to Battle Injustice (abbreviated R-FBI in English, and FBR in Russian) targeting Pashinyan and accusing him of “economic terrorism.” 55 copies across 55 domains were published between May 13 and May 14.

PASHINYAN'S ECONOMIC TERROR: HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF DISSIDENT BUSINESSES IN ARMENIA

Nikol Pashinyan, officials and businessmen close to him have established a system of unlawful seizures of major business assets for personal enrichment. State agencies—the National Security Service, the Tax Committee, the Prosecutor's Office, and the courts—are used to pressure independent entrepreneurs. Analysis of high-profile cases and victim testimonies reveal a consistent pattern: political disloyalty leads to criminal cases, tax suffocation, and the forced transfer of assets. As a result, there is a dangerous concentration of economic influence in the hands of a narrow circle of individuals loyal to Pashinyan and the "Civic Contract" party. This process has intensified particularly ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections and is leading to the formation of a new party oligarchy that undermines the foundations of political competition and the rule of law in the country.



Քաղաքական Սամուլ Վերլուծական

Հայ Ինֆո

Քաղաքական

Ամերիկյան Լրագրողներ. Փաշինյանը «Տնտեսական Ահաբեկչություն» Է Իրականացնում Հայաստանում Անհավատարիմ Բիզնեսի Դեմ

© Արտավազը Խանգաղյան 13.05.2026 0



Fig 20. Screenshots of the duplicated R-FBI article to Storm-1516 site hayinfo[.]am.

This article was also amplified on X by seemingly pro-MAGA accounts linking to a copy of the R-FBI article [published](#) by Veteran Foreign Policy. The article was [amplified](#) by Lucas Leiroz, who identified himself as a columnist for InfoBRICS linked to the InfoRos Russia-led online influence campaign. According to VIGINUM, Leiroz also [belongs](#) to Brazilian organisation Nova Resistencia, close to Aleksandr Dugin.




Fig 21. screenshots from tweets from [1Nicdar](#) and [Lucas Leiroz](#)

Seventeen Storm-1516 domains targeted France's municipal election, used the same online infrastructure as Armenia-focused campaign

During our investigation, we uncovered seventeen domain names that also harboured Storm-1516 fake news sites that targeted France. These overlapped significantly with the infrastructure of the Armenia operation. Upon closer analysis, the domains appeared to have laid dormant since November and December 2025 and started actively publishing in early March, as France entered the period of its municipal election.

The registration period of the domains between October 2025 and January 2026 also highly suggests that, together with the infrastructure, the deployment of the campaigns targeting France and Armenia were put into execution simultaneously, sharing four IP addresses between the two networks (see Appendix 2).

IP address 151[.]80[.]21[.]75 hosted eight of 17 French domains and also three Armenian ones (lur360[.]com, karevorimasin[.]am, armdailynews[.]com), highlighting shared infrastructure across both networks. The two IP addresses 208[.]109[.]215[.]186 and 198[.]23[.]61[.]64 also appear in both Armenia and France campaigns. IP address 91[.]239[.]146[.]131 hosted both French (journaldujour[.]net, lespartisans[.]net) and Armenian (haynewsnow[.]com, yerevandaily[.]am, lratu[.]com) domains.




Fig 23. Infrastructure overlap between the two campaigns

Using the same method described above, to download the content of 18 WordPress sites using their REST API, we obtained a dataset of more than 5,543 articles across 18 Storm-1516 sites. Some websites were deplatformed between our first discovery of the domains and the data collection process. By analyzing the data of the articles we obtained, we plotted the network’s activity over time, identifying surges in publishing correlated to the start of the French municipal elections. In addition, we queried the content of the websites in order to understand what parties and candidates it focused on. We also used Anthropic’s Claude AI to identify recurring topics.

The network’s activity peaked in March 2026, with 1,651 posts, spreading claims about [economic collapse](#), targeting President [Macron](#) across 643 articles, and [promoting](#) a new “world order,” notably aligned with the BRICS. The network covered and amplified the perception of political chaos due to unpredictable US politics (618 articles), sharing [catastrophising views](#). It also [covered](#) the Iran war and Middle East instability in 489 articles.

The network also covered domestic topics, raising concerns about [crime](#) in 383 articles and [shared](#) conspiratorial content naming sex offender Jeffrey Epstein on 331 occasions. Websites also [mentioned](#) Ukraine in 324 articles sharing disinformation targeting Ukrainian refugees, for instance.

By asking Anthropic Claude’s AI to break down articles on domestic politics into themes, we identified articles that amplified the following views.



Theme	Articles
Insécurité / délinquance (insecurity / delinquency)	1,048
Migrants / immigration (immigrants / immigration)	623
Islam / islamisme (Islam / Islamism)	497
Afrique / colonisation (Africa / colonization)	319
2027 présidentielle (2027 French presidential election)	79

Fig 24. Recurring topics in the dataset according to Claude AI

While the French 2027 presidential election is mentioned, we identified 338 articles that specifically [targeted](#) France's 2026 municipal elections last March. The week of March 2 (517 posts), which coincided with the first round of French municipal elections, saw a sharp increase in the network's output.

The network spread tropes [impersonating](#) for instance, the French Telecommunication Authority (ARCOM), [accusing](#) it of censorship ahead of the 2026 vote and impersonated numerous French journalists.

While one domain focused on President Macron ([prisonnierdumacronime\[.\]fr](#)), the network specifically targeted left-wing parties, associating them with negative narratives. The table below lists mentions of parties among 338 articles that focused on the municipal elections.

Party	Articles
LFI / France Insoumise	61
PS / Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party)	31
Renaissance / Macron	14



RN / Rassemblement National (National Rally)	11
Les Républicains (The Republicans)	9
PCF / Communiste (French Communist Party)	9
EELV / Verts (The Ecologists – Europe Ecology The Greens)	7

Fig 26. Articles mentioning political parties, manually queried.

On occasions, the network targeted politicians directly, and focused on La France Insoumise (LFI), sharing [headlines](#) such as Roubaix LFI mayor boosting his allies' salaries by 138%, founder of the party Jean-Luc Mélenchon [threatening](#) to "dissolve media monopolies," and LFI [seizing](#) control of public broadcasting.

The Greens had two dedicated "collapse" articles on March 26 ([1](#), [2](#)); a coordinated same-day narrative push against the party. While right-wing and far-right parties appeared rarely in the network's content, the municipal elections themselves are covered through a decline lens ([1](#), [2](#), [3](#)).

In one instance, French National Rally president Jordan Bardella was [mentioned](#) explicitly, with a narrative advocating to "end public media."

Overall, the key topics covered by the network during the March election were framed by relying on polarizing and fearmongering topics such as crime, immigration, and the 2027 election as the collapse of French democracy. Crime remained the dominant topic (found in the framing of at least 766 articles) constant knife attacks, gang crime, violence in suburbs, always with ethnic/national framing of suspects in the headlines ([1](#), [2](#), [3](#), [4](#), [5](#), [6](#), [7](#), [8](#)). Further, the network focused on multiple instances on the dissolution of the CCIF (Collective Against Islamophobia in France) and Tariq Ramadan ([1](#), [2](#), [3](#)).

Additionally, the 2027 electoral content is ominous in tone, framing institutional collapse around the next election by accusing President Macron, or even alleging that the French parliament [could](#) cancel the upcoming presidential election. ([1](#), [2](#), [3](#))

CONCLUSION

Our investigation shows that since at least late 2025, Russia has deployed multilayered efforts to influence Armenia's elections and their outcome by both targeting audiences inside of the country and worldwide. The obtained leaked documents, which we verified using OSINT research, also underscore that SDA operators acquired online assets linked to transnational organisations such as the CSTO and the CIS to further discredit Pashinyan's candidacy, information that should also raise concerns regarding Russia's intentions to conduct covert influence IMSs aiming even its own allies. Apart from Kremlin-linked actors, people from the Armenian diaspora and Azerbaijan frequently used AI-fuelled disinformation videos to discredit or criticize the Prime Minister.

We also observed an increase of the use of Max[.]ru channels alongside Telegram channels, shortly after the former was designated as the official messaging app in Russia to the detriment of the latter. Although Russian authorities presented Max[.]ru as a messenger app only, it is clear that it is used, like Telegram, to spread narratives in FIMI campaigns such as Overload and Pravda.

Reports based on leaked information documenting linkages between SDA and Storm-1516 further support the theory of a coordinated and concerted effort to undermine Armenia's presidential vote and candidates advocating for a pro-Western agenda, including rapprochement towards the EU. All in all, these campaigns and the IMS under which they are described point at the involvement of high-level Russian government and presidential administration-sponsored entities.

IMSs Overload and Pravda show that in support of Russia's critical stance, they tailored false narratives and disseminated tropes, with the aim of causing reputational damage to candidates and discrediting them to domestic and global audiences. Our investigation also documents domain registration time overlaps between the Armenia and France-focused Storm-1516 campaigns, once again pointing at Russia's global influence strategy, targeting political parties, candidates and seeding narratives that capitalize on economic hardships and defiance against democratic processes.

APPENDIX

Review process

This report was reviewed by three researchers following the [ObsINT guidelines](#) and [CheckFirst's assessment process](#).

The external reviewers for this document are :

- In-house researchers
- Information Integrity and Geopolitics expert

This document has scored **77.78 out of 100** after review.

Archiving Policy

All the assets captured by CheckFirst were archived and are available upon request at info@checkfirst.network.

Keywords used during the data collection

“Pashinyan”, “Pachinian”, “#AllEyesOnArmenia”, “Arménie”, “Armenia”, “Artsakh”, “Пашинян”, “выборы”, “Армения”, “Карабах”

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Appendix 1: List of Armenia-focused Storm-1516 domains

Domain	Registrar	Registration date	IP
armenianview[.]am	abcdomain	11/29/2025	82.25.102.199
haypressinfo[.]com	ultahost	11/29/2025	31.210.50.51
reportarmenia[.]am	abcdomain	11/15/2025	188.165.0.143
lratvakanalik[.]am	proitlab	11/11/2025	2.56.204.6
haynewsnow[.]com	Navicosoft Pty Ltd	11/27/2025	91.239.146.131
armbreaking[.]com	Ultahost	11/25/2025	31.210.50.51
lernashkharh[.]am	istc	12/24/2025	185.100.87.82
tavushmedia[.]com	NameCheap	12/15/2025	198.54.116.48
geghamalerner[.]am	name	12/14/2025	51.38.26.56
armarz[.]am	regnest	12/19/2025	31.210.50.51
hayapaga[.]am	globalar	12/28/2025	198.23.61.64
yerkir24[.]am	abcdomain	11/12/2025	46.202.142.45
yerevandailynews[.]am	globalar	12/21/2025	66.29.148.118
armcomment[.]am	abcdomain	11/12/2025	93.113.174.116

Domain	Registrar	Registration date	IP
armtrend[.]am	istc	11/29/2025	198.23.61.64
hayhotnews[.]com	Spaceship	11/26/2025	209.74.76.6
hayinstant[.]com	NameCheap	11/28/2025	184.94.213.127
hayreniknews[.]am	globalar	11/16/2025	208.109.215.186
mamulservice[.]am	globalar	12/21/2025	208.109.215.186
hayresearch[.]am	abccdomain	11/20/2025	192.64.150.142
teghekatu24[.]am	abccdomain	12/29/2025	192.64.150.45
yerevandaily[.]am	proitlab	03/06/2026	91.239.146.131
armlive24[.]com	registrar.eu	2025-11-15T17:41:12Z	91.99.127.1
armenianpress[.]am	abccdomain	2025-11-26	192.64.150.142
arevmedia[.]am	globalar	2025-12-16	208.109.215.186
armenianjournal[.]am	globalar	2025-12-12	208.109.215.186
armeniannews24[.]am	globalar	2025-12-03	208.109.215.186



Domain	Registrar	Registration date	IP
armreporter[.]am	globalar	2025-11-21	208.109.215.186
lur360[.]com	namesrs.com	2025-11-24T01:21:20Z	151.80.21.75
karevorimasin[.]am	regnest	2025-11-23	151.80.21.75
hayvoice[.]am	itproject	2025-11-14	144.76.80.91
zhamarzhm[.]am	regnest	2025-12-14	31.210.50.51
lureriashkharh[.]am	istc	2025-12-16	31.210.50.51
zrutsakits[.]am	globalar	2025-12-19	144.76.80.91
armword[.]am	globalar	2025-11-17	144.76.80.91
nshanaket[.]am	itproject	2025-12-12	144.76.80.91
azdar[.]am	itproject	2025-12-24	192.64.150.45
shiraktesutyun[.]am	abcdomain	2025-12-25	198.23.61.64
lratu[.]com	regnest	2025-11-22T18:48:35Z	91.239.146.131
24arm[.]am	navicosoft	2025-11-19	209.42.31.59
armdailynews[.]com/	abcdomain	2025-12-01T22:23:21Z	151.80.21.75



Domain	Registrar	Registration date	IP
armenianway[.]am	abcdomain	2025-12-18	45.84.205.141
hayinfo[.]am	proitlab	2025-11-29	2.56.204.6
hayobserver[.]com	abcdomain	2025-11-30T12:53:27 Z	91.99.127.1
khosnak[.]am	abcdomain	2025-12-18	178.160.195.15
noymedia[.]am	proitlab	2025-12-26	66.29.148.143
yerevanpress[.]am	abcdomain	2025-11-16	192.64.150.142
yerevantimes[.]am	itproject	2025-12-28	208.109.215.18 6
լրաբեր[.]հայ	proitlab	2025-11-17	2.56.204.6
այսօր[.]հայ	proitlab	2025-12-10	2.56.204.6
տեսակետ[.]հայ	proitlab	2025-11-22	2.56.204.6
թարմլուրեր[.]հայ	name	2025-12-11	51.38.26.56
հայլրատվութիւն[.]հայ	proitlab	2025-12-25	2.56.204.6
հայաշխարհ[.]հայ	proitlab	2025-12-26	51.38.26.56
հայմեդիա[.]հայ	proitlab	2025-11-27	2.56.204.6
հայօր[.]հայ	name	2025-12-30	178.160.195.15



Appendix 2: List of France-focused Storm-1516 domains

Domains	IP	Registration date	Registrar
presse-alerte[.]fr	208[.]109[.]215[.]186	2025-12-24T11:49:57.06798Z	NETIM
journalnational[.]fr	208[.]109[.]215[.]186	2026-01-23T18:27:25.572215Z	NETIM
le-principal-hebdomadaire[.]fr	208[.]109[.]215[.]186	2025-12-17T10:30:47.314627Z	NETIM
france-reportage[.]fr	151[.]80[.]21[.]75	2025-12-25	NETIM
lyonnais-express[.]fr	151[.]80[.]21[.]75	2025-11-22T14:29:50.533841Z	Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Openprovider
prisonnierdumacronisme[.]fr	151[.]80[.]21[.]75	2025-11-26T10:41:02.680045Z	Dynadot Inc
lire-lhebdo[.]fr	151[.]80[.]21[.]75	2025-12-28T09:52:45.570199Z	Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Openprovider
marseillematch[.]fr	151[.]80[.]21[.]75	2025-12-07T12:49:11.174545Z	Infomaniak Network SA

enpleinessorfr[.]com	151[.]80[.]21[.]75	2026-02-13T17:02:08Z	Realtime Register B.V.
visiondumonde[.]net	151[.]80[.]21[.]75	2025-10-03T20:37:54Z	101domain GRS Limited
observateurdujour[.]fr	151[.]80[.]21[.]75	2025-10-05	101domain.com
lechiquier24[.]fr	151[.]80[.]21[.]75	2025-10-03T20:37:54Z	Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Openprovider
republiquelibre[.]fr	198[.]23[.]61[.]64	2025-12-15T12:12:03.669471Z	Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Openprovider
paris-today[.]fr	198[.]23[.]61[.]64	2025-11-11T13:47:32.234803Z	EURODNS S.A.
figaroquotidien[.]com	198[.]23[.]61[.]64	2026-01-27T09:37:00Z	EURODNS S.A.
journaldujour[.]net	91[.]239[.]146[.]131	2025-09-29T17:31:29Z	Internet Domain Service BS Corp.
lespartisans[.]net	91[.]239[.]146[.]131	2025-10-30T05:01:03Z	Navicosoft Pty Ltd