Our dataset on this pro-Kremlin Information Manipulation Set (IMS) has more than doubled: from over 7 million to more than 15 million articles, published across 88 websites in 47 languages. Here is what changed, what we share openly with the community, and what we make available to analysts who need to go further.
Our dataset on this pro-Kremlin Information Manipulation Set (IMS) has more than doubled: from over 7 million to more than 15 million articles, published across 88 websites in 47 languages. Here is what changed, what we share openly with the community, and what we make available to analysts who need to go further.
Ahead of the 2027 French presidential election, CheckFirst joins for the second time the Cyber for Good programme for media outlets developed by Advens for People and Planet. This initiative is designed to bolster the defenses of journalists against cyberattacks and FIMI.
CheckFirst took part in #Disinfo2026, speaking on FIMI infrastructure, covert influence campaigns and DSA vs climate disinformation. The conference opened under pressure: days earlier, three main sponsors had withdrawn their support after Washington reportedly objected to a panel examining the US as a FIMI threat.
For five months, we tracked over 100,000 ads displayed across 131 websites in Eastern Europe. After decoding the hidden mechanisms behind these ads, we uncovered a network of Russian companies. This investigation reveals what data is harvested from Romanians, who ends up receiving it, and why the ads shown on platforms with conspiratorial and extremist content are among the most valuable to this network.
We are delighted and proud to celebrate our sixth anniversary! We marked this occasion by reflecting on our achievements and learnings over the past year.
Our new investigation reveals how a sophisticated Russian information manipulation set (IMS), dubbed “Roska Bridge”, uses alternative and decentralised social media platforms as a weapon to flood Western and domestic Russian audiences with aggressive, anti-Western, and anti-Ukrainian propaganda.
We spent one month ahead of Armenian parliamentary elections monitoring disinformation spread by foreign Information Manipulation Sets and tracking what recommendation algorithms were pushing to diaspora users searching for content about the vote.
We run OSINT investigations. We contributed to create methodological and ethical guidelines to frame the practice. Logically, we developed a platform to help organisations strengthen their staff’s resilience against information manipulation, foreign influence, and disinformation campaigns.
On May 19th, Nelly Pailleux discussed the ethical implications while conducting OSINT investigations in light of the ObSINT guidelines.
Meet CheckFirst’s Import Connector, which brings in real-time data directly from the Pravda network.
CheckFirst empowers its partners to navigate today’s complex online information ecosystem and equips decisionmakers with customisable solutions to combat online harms.
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